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INTRODUCTION  
 
Canada’s choice in 1984 to make private health care purchases an exclusive (opting-out) 
alternative for service providers, rather than a supplement to publicly financed health care 
services provided in hospitals and/or by a physician is unique among member countries of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).1 To meet the 
conditions for full transfer payments from the federal government under the 1984 Canada 
Health Act (CHA), the provinces have regulated — and, in some cases, prohibited outright 
— private payment and private insurance for publicly insured services.2 An implication of 
the fact that Canada’s single-payer public health insurance systems are for the most part 
financed by the progressive tax systems of the federal and provincial governments is that 
resources are redistributed not only from healthier to less healthy Canadians but also from 
higher- to lower-income Canadians. Understanding the evolution of Canada’s single-payer 
system of health care finance, therefore, requires an appreciation of the implications for 
voters of income redistribution as well as the restrictions placed on their access to privately 
financed health services. 
 
At the outset, finance arrangements for health care in Canada were much different from 
what we have today. Yet, in studies of the evolution of public budget constraints on health 
care over the past half-century, surprisingly little attention has been paid to how we pay for 
health care affects how much we spend on health care. Thus, the broad purpose of this 
paper is to look at the shift from contributory to non-contributory health care finance, cost 
sharing between the federal and provincial governments, and the softening of public health 
insurance budget constraints through borrowing in order to understand the role these fiscal 
changes have played in the evolution of health care spending and to determine whether the 
status quo of health care financing in Canada is sustainable. 
 
The policy debate is also confused by vague notions of the appropriate level of health 
spending. For example, the final report of the Commission on the Future of Health Care in 
Canada (the Romanow Report) suggests that “Canadians want necessary hospital and 
physician services to be fully funded through our taxes” (Romanow 2002, 31). It is not 
obvious, however, what it means to fully fund necessary hospital and physician services. 
Whose level of services is to be fully funded? If everyone’s care were fully funded — that 
is, if the highest demand were met — then most people would be overinsured in the sense 
that more funding would be provided than they would want or need. What would be the 
cost of meeting this level of demand and would it be palatable to the majority of voters? Or 
is the idea a notional one that average demand should be fully funded, in which case the 
health care services of many Canadians would be less than fully funded, which would 
create demand for supplementary revenue channels such as private insurance?  
 
                                                 
1 Since 1975 the public share of health care finance in Canada has been around the OECD average of 74%, but in 
other OECD countries private payment allows individuals to supplement the quantity and quality of publicly 
provided health care. Canada reserves private payment for non-medicare categories of health care expenditures such 
as long-term care, drugs, and non-physician-provided services. See Gouveia (1997). 
2 For a discussion of Canada’s varied health care systems — each province and territory administers its own system 
according to conditions defined by the CHA — see Boychuk (2008a). 
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In this paper, I present a median-voter model (following Gouveia 1997 and Kifmann 2005) 
that embodies features of most public health insurance systems and that addresses several 
issues for debate around the restructuring of health care finance in Canada. In particular, 
the model describes the political economy of public insurance in the presence of private 
insurance, so that it can be used to assess the effects and welfare costs of the CHA’s 
precluding private insurance for medicare services.3 For example, the model can help to 
answer such questions as whether Canada’s single-payer arrangement increases or 
decreases the level of public health care expenditures relative to a mixed system, and how 
generous public insurance would have to be to crowd out all demand for private coverage. 
The model can also be used to identify the policy and economic drivers behind the CHA’s 
preclusion of private payment, as well as political challenges to the preclusion of private 
insurance and private payment since the 1990s. 
 
The paper demonstrates how non-contributory finance and effective subsidization of public 
health care spending with federal cost sharing crowded out demand for private insurance as 
voters opted for high levels of public health spending. It also shows why the Romanow 
Report’s call for increases in federal cash transfers to provinces for health care spending 
would result in an increase in provincial health spending and a diminution of the demand 
for private health insurance. It is not clear, however, that federal subsidization of health 
spending is either sustainable or socially desirable. Indeed, as Canada’s population ages, 
the current financing of health care represents enormous unfunded liabilities for the 
provinces (Robson 2001, 2007). To sustain current levels and growth rates of health 
spending without tying current revenues to that objective means asking the next generation 
of working Canadians to pay far more for their health care than do working Canadians 
today. Although the effect of population aging on health care expenditures is projected to 
be modest, the model nevertheless suggests it could trigger a serious political crisis for 
Canadian medicare as taxes rise.  
 
Finally, the model highlights that the sustainability of Canadian medicare is not the right 
focus for the debate, in the sense that there is no call to eliminate universal public health 
care finance. Rather, the more appropriate sustainability question concerns the CHA’s 
precluding a mixed private/public financing arrangement for health services in the light of 
both restraints on public health spending, as governments bring it more in line with current 
revenues, and rising demand for supplementary private health insurance. 
  
THE EVOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT FINANCE OF HEALTH CARE IN CANADA 
 
Canadian medicare is not an insurance system, and there is no clear link between health 
expenditures and the tax price for paying for them. Since the passage of the 1957 Hospital 
Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act (HIDS) and the 1966 Medical Care Act, the federal 
and provincial governments have relied increasingly on non-contributory finance to pay for 
                                                 
3 Here I am thinking of private insurance that is similar to the role it plays in, say, Australia. That country has a 
parallel system of public and private health insurance where the private health care system is seen as complementary 
to, rather than competitive with, the public system. Australian private health insurance operates in large part as gap 
insurance or as a means to pay for quality enhancements not covered by public health insurance. See Donato and 
Scotton (1998); and Shiell and Seymour (2002). 
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health care services provided by physicians and hospitals. Payments, for the most part, are 
from general government revenues, as opposed to a contributory scheme such as the 
Canada Pension Plan, where expenditures are financed with tax revenues generated 
specifically for that purpose.4  
 
The earliest Canadian scheme to finance health care costs was Saskatchewan’s 1947 
Hospital Services Plan, under which premiums were levied specifically to pay for hospital 
costs on a contributory basis.5 The plan did not preclude private payments through co-
insurance or user fees for publicly financed services. Then, in 1957, the Diefenbaker 
government brought in the HIDS, which Boychuk (2008b, 113-114) argues had 
characteristics that led to the development of current health care financing arrangements, 
although their iconic features more correctly were an unintended consequence of the 
political forces that led to public health insurance supported by federal “50/50” cost 
sharing.  
 
Constitutionally, health care is a provincial responsibility, a fact that influenced how health 
care came to be publicly financed. Since a national health insurance scheme administered 
by the federal government seemed impractical, the expedient solution was to have federal 
payment in support of provincially administered health insurance. According to Gagan and 
Gagan (2002, 94-95), the provinces, fearing that a national health insurance would be a 
“federal tax grab,” called in the 1950s for health insurance to be a provincial initiative 
funded “primarily through generous transfer payments from the federal government.” 
Under the 1957 HIDS and the 1966 Medical Care Act, the federal government agreed to 
share the costs of provincial hospital programs and physicians’ services so long as the 
programs satisfied conditions of comprehensiveness, universality, portability, and public 
administration (see Banting and Boadway 2004, 8-9). This agreement to share the costs 
helped to persuade higher-income provinces Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario to join 
the federal plan even though their governments previously had expressed a commitment to 
the principle of private insurance for most of the population and to limiting the role of 
public programs to covering hard-to-insure groups such as the elderly and the poor.6 
                                                 
4 Ontario, British Columbia, and Alberta make use of health care “premiums” but these revenues cover only a 
portion of total health care costs in those provinces. The premiums are not reflective of risk characteristics of 
individuals, their use of health care services, or their income, so that, in effect, they are a kind of “poll tax,” 
distinguished from other government revenues only in that their levy is notionally tied to paying for health care. As 
these premiums are not separated out from other government revenues once collected, however, they are not 
necessarily allocated to health care — in much the same way that gasoline taxes are not spent solely on expenditures 
sensitive to automobile use. See Boychuk (2008b) for discussion of the use of health care premiums in Canadian 
medicare. 
5 See Gagan and Gagan (2002, 11-12, 92-96). Before the plan came into being, hospitals were obligated to provide 
care to the indigent, the costs of which were covered by a combination of municipal government grants to hospitals, 
charitable donations, and fees charged to paying patients. With the rising cost of medical care due to rising fees 
charged by hospitals, the number of paying patients declined and hospital finance became a challenge, made worse 
by the dire economic conditions of the 1930s. 
6 See Taylor (1978, 340-341); and Boychuk (2008b, 127-130). In other words, in the absence of federal cost sharing, 
the higher-income provinces would have preferred a health care system similar to the one the United States 
developed in the 1960s. Indeed, Alberta premier Ernest Manning would have preferred to continue that province’s 
voluntary, privately operated medical services plan, whereby only Albertans with incomes above a defined threshold 
paid premiums. He explained, however, that opting out of the federal program was not an option: “The province’s 
only option is to take the [federal] program in its entirety or refuse it in its entirety. But if it refuses, it can only 
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Boychuk (2008b, 113-114) argues that the goals of public health insurance in Canada were 
not rooted in egalitarian ideals but instead reflected a desire to keep direct public control 
over public funds. To this end, the federal government established conditions for its 
sharing hospital costs with the provinces that precluded using federal funds to subsidize 
insurance provision through private plans. Politically, Ottawa wanted its funds to be seen 
as a benefit to all Canadians, so it would not provide cost sharing to provinces that did not 
have universal coverage, which discouraged provinces from reserving public insurance for 
the poor and the aged. Ottawa also discouraged the use of premiums and co-insurance by 
matching provincial government expenditures on hospitals but not expenditures financed 
by payments by patients. Consequently, by the 1980s, most provinces had moved away 
from health insurance premiums. 
 
Critics of the 50/50 cost-sharing arrangement argued that it created the incentive for 
provinces to expand the generosity of their programs, and expressed concerns about the 
federal government’s ability to control its own budget with an open-ended commitment to 
pay half of provincial health care expenditures (see Banting and Boadway 2004, 11). With 
the Established Programs Financing (EPF) arrangement of 1977, transfers for hospital and 
medical services, along with post-secondary financing, were combined into a single block 
grant. The EPF transfer was an equal per capita payment to each province that was paid 
both as cash and as a transfer of tax points.7 Over time, the tax-point portion of the transfer 
has increased and the cash portion decreased.8  
 
Monique Bégin, the federal minister who tabled Bill C-3 (the CHA) in December 1983, 
explains (2002) that the act was intended to stem the erosion of medicare that arose as a 
result of changes in how health care was financed with the EPF in 1977. Following the 
changes under the EPF, provinces cut health care budgets and extra billing by doctors and 
user fees became more prevalent. For the federal government — whose role was to enforce 
the conditions and regulations about universality, comprehensiveness, portability, and 
public administration defined under the HIDS and the Medical Care Act — the challenge 
was that the EPF had no enforcement mechanism. With the 50/50 cost-share cash transfer, 
Ottawa could refuse to reimburse its half of health care costs for provinces that violated the 
conditions of the medicare acts. With the EPF, however, it had chosen a major tax-points 
transfer associated with an “automatic” monthly lump sum global payment for health (and 
post-secondary education) sent to each provincial treasurer, which meant there was no 
                                                                                                                                                             
refuse to accept the benefits. It cannot refuse to pay its share of the costs because the extra federal taxes that will be 
levied to pay the federal share of a national Medicare plan will be levied on all Canadians....The only so-called 
option is the right to refuse any part of the benefits. I think you will agree that this is hardly an option at all” (quoted 
in Brennan 2008, 150-152). 
7 Tax points are tax transfers where the Government of Canada reduces its tax effort in the provinces to make room 
available to the provinces and territories to raise their own tax revenues. With the 1977 EPF, the federal government 
agreed to give up 13.5 percentage points of personal income tax and 1 percentage point of corporate income tax to 
the provinces and territories. The reduction in federal government revenues collected in the provinces and territories 
is offset by an increase in provincial and territorial tax revenues of the same amount. See Government of Canada, 
Department of Finance’s explanation at http://www.fin.gc.ca/transfers/taxpoint/taxpoint-eng.asp. 
8 Banting and Boadway calculate that federal government transfers for health care as a share of provincial 
government health care expenditures trended down from 41.3% in 1975 to roughly 30% in 2000, while the cash 
portion fell from 41.3% in 1975 to under 15% in 2000 (2004, table 4, 17). 
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longer any means by which to enforce federal conditions for medicare. The CHA 
introduced a fifth condition — that of accessibility — to medicare, indirectly to ban 
physician extra billing and user fees for medicare services. With that change, the federal 
government now could levy a one dollar penalty on the province’s block fund for every 
dollar of extra charges to patients, whatever the source of those charges.9 
 
The significance of the use of tax points through the EPF to allow provinces to finance 
health care is that, unlike the cost-sharing (all cash payment) arrangement, it notionally ties 
health care expenditures to the provincial tax price of health insurance. If provinces want to 
have more money for health care when the federal government reduces the cash transfer, 
they must raise provincial taxes to do so. Boychuk (2008b, 136) observes that the shift to 
the EPF stabilized federal government expenditures but exposed the provinces to the risk 
of cost increases greater than GDP growth, albeit giving them more flexibility to allocate 
health care expenditures.  
 
The link between income taxes and health care expenditures became even less clear with 
the 1995 Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST), under which, due to its debt and 
deficit situation, the federal government combined the EPF and the transfer for social 
welfare into a single block transfer. Although 43% of the CHST transfer was intended for 
provincial health expenditures, the transfers were fungible across categories of 
expenditure. Federal cash transfers to the provinces were cut by 20% between fiscal years 
1995/96 and 1997/98 (Evans 2003, 13-14). 
 
After 2000, the federal government made several commitments for spending on health care 
in the provinces to support priority areas such as health care renewal, primary health care 
reform, home care, medical equipment, and catastrophic drug costs.10 In 2003, Ottawa 
committed to spending $36.8 billion through increased CHST transfers ($14 billion), the 
new targeted transfers, the Health Reform Transfer ($16 billion), support for the purchase 
of medical equipment ($1.5 billion), and direct federal spending on health. Following a 
federal commitment to improve the transparency and accountability of its support for 
health and other social programs, in 2004 the CHST was apportioned into two transfers, 
the Canada Health Transfer (CHT) and the Canada Social Transfer (CST). Based on 
existing CHST legislated amounts for these programs, 62% of transfers were allocated to 
the CHT and 38% to the CST. Under the CHT, Ottawa provides legislated cash transfer 
                                                 
9 See Boychuk (2008a) for a detailed discussion of regulation under the CHA. 
10 For a chronology of these changes, see Health Canada’s overview of the evolution of federal transfers online at 
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hcs-sss/medi-assur/cha-lcs/transfer-eng.php. See also Department of Finance, “A History of 
the Health and Social Transfers,” online at http://www.fin.gc.ca/fedprov/his-eng.asp. The latter notes: 2004 
September: First Ministers signed the 10-Year Plan to Strengthen Health Care. In support of the Plan, the 
Government of Canada committed $41.3 billion in additional funding to provinces and territories for health, 
including $35.3 billion in increases to the [Canada Health Transfer] through a base adjustment and an annual 6% 
escalator, $5.5 billion in Wait Times Reduction funding, and $500 million in support of medical equipment. 2003 
February In support of the February 2003 First Ministers' Accord on Health Care Renewal, Budget confirmed: (1) a 
two-year extension to 2007-08 of the five-year legislative framework put in place in September 2000 with an 
additional $1.8 billion; (2) a $2.5 billion CHST supplement, giving provinces the flexibility to draw down funds as 
they require up to the end of 2005-06; and (3) the restructuring of the CHST to create a separate Canada Health 
Transfer and a Canada Social Transfer effective April 1, 2004, in order to increase transparency and accountability. 
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amounts — which grew by an average annual rate of 10.2% per year over the five years up 
to fiscal year 2007/08 — and a tax transfer component that grows with the economy. 
 
Although the CHT makes it clearer than did EPF and the CHST how much the federal 
government transfers for health and restores some of the importance of cash transfers for 
health, it still maintains the link between provincial taxation effort and provincial health 
spending, and federal health transfers are still more fungible across government programs 
than under 50/50 cost sharing. 
 
Government borrowing has been another important element of the fiscal arrangements for 
paying for medicare since 1975 (see Figure 1). Until that year, neither the provinces in 
aggregate nor the federal government had net borrowing. Between 1976 and 1981, 
however, the federal government borrowed and ran growing deficits. In contrast, the 
provinces maintained relatively balanced books until 1981, after which they ran relatively 
small deficits. In the 1980s, provincial governments opted to borrow to offset reduced cash 
transfers from the federal government. Indeed, after 1988, provincial borrowing grew 
rapidly, and budget balances were not restored until after 1996. Not until after 1992, by 
which time the provinces were addressing their deficits, were changes in health spending 
obvious (see Chung and Kneebone 2004). Prior to that time, Canadians did not necessarily 
face a tax price of health care that reflected the full resource cost of their well-resourced 
health care systems and when, after 1992 they did, spending on health care fell.  
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Figure 1  
 
Per capita Public Health Spending and Spending on Hospitals  
and Physicians, Canada, 1975-2007 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Canadian Institute for Health Information;  
Statistics Canada, CANSIM II database 
 
 
Medicare, it should be recalled, was introduced through 50/50 cost sharing for health care 
costs between the federal government and provinces. As Romanow (2002, 46) notes, 
 
[h]istorically, the federal government encouraged the adoption of publicly 
administered single-payer insurance systems in the provinces through the use 
of the federal spending power. The success and longevity of medicare is in 
part due to the federal government’s ongoing social program transfers, 
equalization payments, and its willingness to use its political capital to 
promote and defend the system. 
 
If federal taxes were levied solely on personal incomes and if federal taxes were collected 
with equivalent incidence across provinces, then it would be hard to see how Romanow’s 
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emphasis on federal transfers on spending and health would be so important. The taxpayer 
would see no reason to distinguish between paying a federal tax to fund provincial health 
care expenditures or a provincial tax to do so. But federal governments tax corporations 
and, with progressive income taxation, high-income earners pay a large share of total 
federal taxes. Large corporations and high-income individuals are disproportionately 
concentrated in a few provinces. Consequently, residents of some provinces might prefer a 
federal taxation effort along with cash transfers to the provinces to that of their own 
province’s raising the necessary taxes to finance health spending.11 
 
The next section presents a median voter model that provides a framework for 
demonstrating the impact of changing federal/provincial arrangements for financing on the 
level of public health care spending and the emergence of challenges to the single-payer 
system in the 1990s and since. Following that presentation the model will be used to gain 
an understanding of the evolution of the public system of health care. 
 
A MEDIAN VOTER MODEL OF PUBLIC HEALTH CARE FINANCE 
 
The model that I present has some general features that should be noted from the outset.12 
First, there is no gain to be had by enlarging an efficiently financed private insurance 
system over an inefficient tax financed public system as analyzed by Parry (2005). 
Similarly, the model assumes that there are no positive or negative spillovers between the 
public and private system that would indicate that choosing one single system is superior to 
a mixed system.13 For purposes of this analysis, all private insurance contracts are priced to 
be actuarially fair so in the absence of a prohibition on private insurance coverage, there 
would exist “affordable” insurance contracts for all members of the population.14 The 
                                                 
11 Federal equalization payments that are intended to allow provinces to provide services on roughly equal terms 
further weaken the direct link between provincial tax prices of health and the level of health spending. Alberta, 
British Columbia, Ontario, and sometimes Saskatchewan are the only provinces that pay out on net through 
equalization (see Mansell and Schlenker 1995; Courchene 2004). Borrowing by the federal and provincial 
governments could also be interpreted as a subsidy for health care spending so long as Ricardian equivalence does 
not hold — that is, so long as taxpayers do not interpret borrowing today as necessarily leading to a tax increase 
tomorrow. In the Canadian context, for federal borrowing, Ricardian equivalence might not hold for voters in a 
given province for reasons similar to those described above. For provincial borrowing, the option to migrate out of a 
borrowing province means that voters might prefer to borrow today and migrate tomorrow to avoid the tax. The 
aging baby-boom borrowers might not expect to be tomorrow’s taxpayers once they have retired. 
12 The model is akin to Kifmann’s (2005) model which is a simplified version of Gouveia’s (1997). I follow 
Kifmann and use discrete income and risk types in Gouveia’s model. Kifmann’s interest is the conditions under 
which all members of an economy will politically support a public insurance arrangement that has tax payments 
contingent on income even though the level of coverage is independent of income. Kifmann shows that there are 
efficiency gains from the redistributive public arrangement that arises from the existence of “premium risk” which 
can not otherwise be insured. So long as the gap between high and low incomes is not too large, even high income 
members of the population will support public insurance with redistribution inherent in it. 
13 See Tuohy, Flood and Stabile (2004), Evans (2004) and Glied (2008b) for a discussion of these effects. 
14 This is obviously a strong assumption but is defensible given the recent work by Bundorf and Pauly (2006) and 
given that historically, commercial insurers did find ways of insuring poorer groups in society for the costs of burial 
through “industrial insurance”. I ignore overhead/administration loading on the premium to simplify the model. 
Actuarially fair private insurance gives me a useful benchmark against which I can compare the effect of public 
insurance. The literature has established that lower administration costs for public insurance than for private is a big 
source of public insurance cost advantage. My interest is not in explaining why there is public insurance but instead 
what happens to the demand for private coverage when public payment is already available. Adding risk loading to 
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model has a common benefit (as opposed to proportional to income or risk) of public 
health insurance for all members of society so the publicly financed system in the model is 
an egalitarian public system. The model ignores the possibility that voter participation 
differs across groups in society. That assumption amounts to one where all potential voters 
have their interests represented. Finally, the model does not distinguish between quality 
and quantity of health care. Thus, if the privately financed care is delivered in a way that 
there are service enhancements or shorter wait times, this would be represented here by 
higher values of total insurance coverage. 
 
I look at the case where the conditions for constitutional support of public payment for 
health care services have been met and the system in place is financed by contributions 
proportional to income.15 All individuals know their income and risk type. The level of 
public finance for an individual’s health care services, g, will be determined by the median 
voter in a majority rule setting. After g is set by the median voter, individuals can purchase 
additional private health insurance at an actuarially fair price for their risk type.  
 
Kifmann (2005) considers a society in which there are two groups defined by exogenous 
and known incomes yi, where yR denotes high income and yP denotes low income and 
yR>yP. λ denotes the proportion of population who are rich (R) and following Kifmann, I 
assume that λ<0.5. Thus, median income is less than average income ( y ): 
 
pr
median yyyy )1( λλ −+=<  
 
There is some probability πj that an individual will fall ill and there are two risk types in 
society. πH is a high probability of falling ill and πL is a lower risk, so that 1>πH>πL>0. An 
individual’s assignment to each group is exogenous.16 Following Kifmann, μ the 
proportion of high risk types in the population is less than 0.5.17 It then follows that the 
median risk type has a probability of illness that is less than the average risk of illness in 
the population (π ). 
  
LH
Median πμμπππ )1( −+=<  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
the model would have the effect of further dampening demand for private coverage but would not change the 
qualitative results from comparative statics. 
15 Kifmann (2005) defines the conditions under which a majority of the population would support the introduction of 
health insurance, and whether the population will prefer tax payments for it that are dependent on income. In 
Kifmann’s paper, at the constitutional stage where individuals decide if they will support government health 
insurance, an individual knows their income but not their risk type. If the premium risk associated with being high 
versus low risk is uninsurable, then even rich individuals will support public health insurance financed through 
income contingent premiums. Kifmann also considers a poll tax. 
16 Kifmann (2005) presents a case where the risk type of an individual can be negatively correlated with his/her 
income. 
17 Deber et al. (2004) show that in Manitoba between 10 and 20 percent of the population are responsible for the 
majority of health care expenditures. 
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Thus, in this hypothetical society, there are four groups to consider; high income with high 
probability of illness (RH), high income with low probability of illness (RL), low income 
with high probability of illness (PH) and low income with low probability of illness (PL).  
 
There are two states of the world for each type of agent: healthy (0) and sick (1). Agents 
have state-dependent preferences over consumption and health care. Consumptions in 
states 0 and 1 are always positive and the numeraire good. Demand for health care is only 
positive in state 1. Utilities in each state are: 
 
 ∞=∈<><+=
∞=∈<>=
→
+
→
+
)('lim,,0'',0',0)0(),()(
)('lim,,0'',0'),(
0
11
000
hvRhvvvhvcuU
cuRcuucuU
h
co  (1) 
 
Individuals can pay for health services h from two sources: Igh += , where g represents 
the value of health care services paid for by the government through tax financed transfers 
and I represents the value of health service costs covered by private health insurance 
purchased in the market.18 I assume health care is provided in competitive markets, where 
the price of one unit of health care is normalized to unity.19 
 
An individual of a given risk type jπ , j=H,L, can purchase insurance I at a price j jp π≥  
per unit of benefit. With an insurance contract, agents pay a premium Ip j  in states 0 and 
1. If state 1 occurs, agents receive a benefit I from the insurance company to purchase h 
units of health care. If j jp π= , then the individual purchases insurance at an actuarially 
fair price πj whereas a price greater than πj would reflect that there are risk loading or 
administrative loads on the unit price. When insurance prices are actuarially fair, 
individuals purchase “full insurance” contracts that result in equal consumption if both 
states of the world. When j jp π≠ , agents are not fully insured so consumption in each 
state of the world is not equal. When j jp π> , 0, 1,ij ijc c> . If the price of insurance is not 
actuarially fair then agents underinsure in the sense that they have greater consumption 
(lower marginal utility) in the healthy state. It is also the case that insurance coverage will 
be less than total health care demand, I<h which would presumably require that some of 
health care demand is unmet, or the individual pays the balance out of pocket ex post. 
When the price of insurance is better than actuarially fair, agents overinsure and have 
higher consumption when ill than when healthy, and the level of insurance coverage 
exceeds what they need to meet health care demands.20 
 
                                                 
18 If g+I<h, then either some of health care demand is unmet, or out of pocket payments may be required. This can 
occur if g and I are chosen ex ante but h is determined ex post. In this model, h is chosen ex ante as well so our 
consumer is choosing to meet expected health care needs. 
19 Gouveia (1997) incorporates a generic positive price of health care services to incorporate the impact of inflation 
in health care costs on the demand for health insurance. This issue is not central to this analysis so this price was 
normalized to one to simplify the presentation. 
20 These results are well established in the economics literature on insurance demand and the proofs of them in the 
context of this model are available from the author on request. 
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Now I consider publicly provided health insurance g, financed by income proportional 
contributions such that the pay-as-you-go system satisfies the budget constraint: 
 
gyt ⋅=⋅ π  
 
An individual with income iy  pays: 
g
y
y
ty ii π=   (2) 
Note that for R types, 1Ry
y
>  so the proportional tax burden on the R types is greater than 
one, and for the P types it will be less than one. 
 
The tax “price” per unit of g is: 
 
π
y
y
g
ty
t iii ==   (3) 
 
In contrast to demand for private insurance, the price of government health insurance for a 
given type is determined by their proportional income rather than their probability of 
illness.  
 
An individual will vote in support of g>0 if the price of public insurance is less than the 
price of market purchases of insurance: 
 
j
ii
j y
y
or
y
y
π
πππ ⋅>> 1  
 
PH types will always vote in support of g>0 since they have higher than the average risk 
and lower than the average income. By the same reasoning, RL types always prefer g=0 
since their lower than average risk and higher than average income means that the price of 
g for them is greater than what they would pay in the private market.21 For PL types, they 
will support g>0 so long as the transfers from R types to P types that they receive exceed 
the transfers that they make as L types to H types. By similar logic, RH types support g>0 
if the transfers that they receive as H types from L types exceeds the transfers they make as 
R types to L types. 
 
Augmenting that budget constraint to allow for a subsidy s on the tax price of health care 
financed with resources other than the direct income tax on consumers on voters in a given 
province yields: 
                                                 
21 It is interesting to note that historically, most attempts to introduce public health insurance in Canada and the 
United States proposed to restrict compulsory participation to earners under an income ceiling (Emery 2010). This 
would be equivalent to exempting yR types from the program. To pay for the health insurance, taxes would have 
been levied only on yP types so the principle source of redistribution would have been between risk types. Some 
subsidy from the state was proposed in each case which would have redistributed from exempted yR types to yP types. 
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 ( ) gyts ⋅=⋅⋅− π1 . 
 
With a subsidy for the public health care spending, the tax price facing a consumer is:  
 
( )
y
yst ii
π⋅⋅−= 1 . 
 
Unlike the previous public budget constraint, the link between taxes paid for a level of g is 
weakened. If for some reason voters in a province determine that they do not wish to pay 
higher taxes to support a given level of g, then increased federal cash transfers (by 
increasing the value of s) can support the level of health spending in that province.22 What 
is not clear, however, is whether the subsidy is supporting the appropriate level of 
spending, nor whether the subsidy represents a sustainable source of finance for provincial 
health care spending.  
 
To characterize individual demands for government health transfers and private health 
insurance coverage, I assume the government chooses g, holding I fixed, to maximize the 
expected utility of the median voter in the population.23 Individuals are taxed to provide 
public health insurance regardless of whether they are sick or healthy. Once the median 
voter establishes g, I consider a second stage where individuals can choose to purchase 
additional insurance via a private contract. The way to think of the role of g in this model, 
is that once chosen, it moves the consumption endowment point for all individuals. For 
individuals who have some unmet demand for insurance coverage at this new endowment 
point, they will purchase private coverage. In this context, private insurance coverage in 
this model could be interpreted as “gap coverage”. 
 
 
STAGE 1: The Government establishes g 
 
With tax financed public health care, expected utility is given by: 
 
)]()([)()1( ,1,0 hvcucuEU ijjijjij ++−= ππ  (4) 
( ) ( ) g
y
y
syytsc iiiiij π⋅−−=⋅−−= 1)11(,0  (5) 
( ) ( ) hg
y
y
syhgytsc iiiiij −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅−−+=−+⋅−−= π11)()11(,1  (6) 
 
                                                 
22 To simplify the derivations I consider the effect of public borrowing to pay for health care on the median voter’s 
choice of g to be similar to that with s>0 and I consider the subsidy amount to include any net borrowing by 
governments to pay for current health care expenditures. 
23 In the first stage where g is chosen, I treat the decision as akin to one where there is exclusive public provision 
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The preferred level of public health insurance and the demand for health care for an 
individual with income iy  and illness probability jπ  is found by maximizing expected 
utility with respect to g and h.  
 
The equilibrium choices of g and h for an individual with income i(rich or poor) and risk 
type j (low and high) are:24 
 
)1)()1(()1(
)1)(1(2
2
ji
ijj
ij ysys
yysy
g πππ
πππ
+−−−
+−−=  (7) 
ππ
π y
s
h
j
j
ij ⋅+⋅−= 11
1 .  (8) 
 
Consumption in each state for an agent with income iy  and sickness probability jπ  is:  
( )
( ) ( )( )0,
1
1 1
j is
ij
j i
y y
c
y s y
π
π π
−= + − −   (9) 
 
( )( )1, 1 1js ij j
y
c
s
π
π π= − +   (10) 
 
The demand for government provided insurance for a type ij is dependent on the average 
probability of becoming ill, average income, own income, and the own probability of 
becoming ill. Demand for public insurance is decreasing in own income and increasing in 
the probability of becoming ill. The preferred level of health care for type ij depends on 
their probability of becoming ill, but not on their own income. Since H Lπ π> , G GH Lh h> . The 
high risk types prefer higher levels of public health care provision. Demand for health care 
is strictly increasing in average income, and decreasing in the average probability of 
becoming ill. Not surprisingly, the demand for government insurance is strictly increasing 
in the size of the subsidy for both risk types. 
 
As it was assumed that the proportion of high risk types in the population, μ, is less than 
0.5, and the proportion of rich types, λ, is less than 0.5, in a majority voting equilibrium the 
level of public provision will be decided by the low income, low risk  (PL) type who is the 
median voter. The PL types simultaneously choose insurance and health care to maximize 
their utility. The remaining consumer types take the levels of tax financed insurance and 
health care chosen by PL as given. It is important to note, that with the democratic 
structure of this model, the level of g that is chose by PL types will not be influenced by 
the demands of any other groups in society. High income and high risk types can lobby all 
they want, but so long as the median voter is a PL type, their political demands for a 
different level of g will have no influence.  
 
                                                 
24 The maximization problem and the derivations of these solutions are available from the author on request. 
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The majority voting equilibrium level of public health insurance and publicly financed 
health care are with a PL median voter are: 
 
( )
( ) ( ) )1)(1(1
)1(12
2
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PL ysys
yysyg πππ
πππ
+−−−
+−−=  (11) 
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Consumptions for the PL median voter in states 0 and 1 are:  
 
( )
( ) ( )( )PL PLMVPL ysy
yyc ππ
π
−−+
−=
11
1
,0   (13) 
( )( )L
LMV
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yc ππ
π
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The choice of insurance and health care for type PL is equivalent to their choice in a 
competitive market with insurance price PL Pp yy
π= . However, this is not an actuarially 
fair price so 0, 1,
MV MV
PL PLc c≠ . It is useful to compare this situation to the one where the 
insurance price is actuarially fair. Consumption for type PL when faced with price 
PL Lp π=  is:  
 
0, 1, 1
P
PL PL
L
yc c π
∗ ∗= = +  
 
 
Comparing these full insurance consumption levels to equations (9) and (10), I can 
determine a condition for overinsurance in the case of public provision. If the tax price is 
less than Lπ , then 0, 0,MVPL PLc c∗ >  since the PL type chooses to overinsure so that consumption 
in the unhealthy state exceeds consumption in the healthy state. For the PL median voter to 
choose  g>0, 
P L
y
y
π
π> , which reflects that the income transfer from rich to poor is greater 
than the transfer from low-risk to high-risk making the tax price of g better than actuarially 
fair for PL types. Since there is a diminishing marginal utility of income, this condition 
means that income in the healthy state will be lower than in the unhealthy state if PL types 
are to politically support g>0. In other words, PL types select a level of g which leaves 
them “over-insured”. As discussed earlier, it is also the case that for PL types, the level of 
g exceeds h meaning the level of public finance transfers more income between the healthy 
and unhealthy states than what they need to meet their health care demands. Since 
government finance pays for h this situation would be observed as a well resourced health 
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care sector relative to what would be observed if there were only private finance of h.25 
The condition for type PL to overinsure relative to the actuarially fair insurance price was 
P L
y
y
π
π>  and with the subsidized tax price becomes ( )1P L
y s
y
π
π> − . So overinsurance 
becomes more likely with a subsidy. It can be shown that PL types choose higher g and h 
with s>0, and hence overinsures further with a subsidy relative to the non-subsidized tax 
price. 
  
 
STAGE 2: Individuals can choose I≥0 
 
As noted earlier, each risk type can purchase market health insurance I at an actuarially fair 
price. Given the structure of the political process, it is also the case the PL types select g 
and the other three groups take that level of coverage, and the taxes paid, as given when 
they choose how much supplementary coverage to purchase. Another way to think of the 
role of g, is that once chosen, it moves the consumption endowment point for all 
individuals. For individuals who remain less than fully insured, they will purchase private 
coverage to fully insure them relative to the new endowment point. In this context, private 
insurance coverage in this model could be interpreted as “gap coverage”. 
 
Each type of agent chooses Iij and hij to maximize expected utility taking the level of g and 
the taxes needed to finance that level of g as given. I assume that I can be purchased at an 
actuarially fair price.  
 ( ) ( )( )[ ])()1(1)1(max
0,0 ijijijj
MV
PLiijijj
MV
PLiijijhI
hvhIgtyuIgtyuEU +−++−++−−−=
≥≥
ππππ
 
Solving for the utility maximizing choices of h and I for a given type yields the following 
insurance demand function: 
 
 πππ y
ytgtyI ii
MV
PL
j
i
j
i
ij =⋅+
+−+=   where1
1
1
*      (15) 
 
Market insurance is purchased to fill the gap between government payment and a fully 
insured consumption position. Since the insurance demand function is linear in income, 
high income (R types) individuals purchase more insurance than low income individuals (P 
types). And since H Lπ π> , high risk types purchase less insurance than low risk types, so: 
                                                 
25 This “over-resourcing” of the health sector could be apparent in several ways. For example, there could more 
health care service providers servicing the population than otherwise; no barriers to access and perhaps higher 
quality services such as private rooms versus general ward beds. The over-resourcing could be apparent in the up-
skilling of service providers, or substituting to more expensive labour to provide services (e.g. doctors do things 
that nurses could do). Excess capacity in the health care system could result in the use of high cost acute care beds 
for elderly patients who could be serviced in lower cost continuing care facilities. Finally, over-resourcing could 
be a reason why health care systems in Canada do many things like research that they do not need to do and that 
do not produce health care services. Finally, the generous resourcing of the system may inflate the incomes of 
service providers and system administrators.  
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****  and iRiLPjRj IIII >>  
 
I assume that supplemental insurance demands must be positive so that it is not possible to 
buy a contract that transfers income from the unhealthy state to the healthy state. 
 
i
iMV
PLij t
y
gI +<> 1,0
*  
 
Substituting in the PL type median voter choice of g confirms the result that low income 
(yP types) individuals will not demand any positive level of market insurance if their tax 
price is less than the actuarially fair price for market coverage. Intuitively, this is because 
the net subsidy necessary to make government insurance politically sustainable also results 
in yP types, both H and L risks, being overinsured. I know that if PL types have no demand 
for supplementary insurance in this model, then neither will PH types since the condition 
for I>0 is independent of risk type and depends solely on income type. 
 
High income individuals want more insurance than P types, hence there could be demand 
for supplementary insurance coverage from yR types.26 The difficulty with precisely 
pinning down the conditions for positive supplementary insurance demand is that the 
condition is a non-linear function of the tax rates, and a quadratic function in tR in 
particular.27 I know that the gap in tax prices for g for R and P types must be positive 
otherwise the yP types would never support g>0. This condition also puts limits on how 
large the gap in tax rates can be for there to be supplementary insurance demand for yR 
types. tR is increasing the ratio of yR to average income and as tR increases for a given tP, 
the PL median voter increases the level of g. These two influences work against yR types 
having demand for supplementary insurance by reducing the size of the insurance gap by 
raising g and by reducing after tax income. 
  
 
EXPLAINING THE EVOLUTION OF HEALTH SPENDING IN CANADA  
 
With the introduction of government health insurance in the 1950s and 1960s, there was 
little political pressure or demand for private insurance for publicly financed health care 
services. Under federal/provincial government cost sharing, taxpayers did not pay the full 
resource cost of health care through their provincial income tax systems. The significance 
of the use of tax points through EPF, the CHST, and the CHT to allow the provinces to 
                                                 
26 Even if yR types have no demand for supplementary insurance, one cannot say that RL types are made better off by 
public health insurance. In the absence of a subsidy for g, they would be unambiguously better off if they could 
purchase private insurance in the absence of the public system. 
27 Evaluating the 0* >RjI  condition shows a positive demand for supplementary insurance when: 
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finance health care, however, is that, unlike cost sharing, it creates a clearer link in the 
minds of voters and politicians between health care expenditures and the tax price of health 
insurance — at least, it reduces the size of the subsidy of the health care services 
individuals obtain.  
 
What effect would a subsidized tax price and deficit financing have on government health 
spending and on the demand for supplementary insurance? As one would expect, the 
median voter model shows that a subsidy increases the size of government health 
expenditures and, depending on the size of the subsidy, drives the demand for 
supplementary insurance toward zero. Conversely, reducing the size of the subsidy reduces 
the amount of government-provided health care services and increases the demand among 
high-income individuals for supplementary insurance. 
 
Evans (2003, 19; 2004) alleges that the strain on financing the public health care system 
has arisen because governments have been more sensitive to the policy preferences of 
higher-income Canadians and, presumably, corporations.28 For this to be the case, 
however, the median voter would have to be an individual with high income. Clearly, if 
this were so, in the absence of a subsidy a prohibition on private insurance would be 
needed to ensure that high-income individuals choose a level of health care services that is 
greater than zero, otherwise they would use their political power as voters to choose not to 
pay for health care services at all,29 which they obviously would strictly prefer. If this were 
not the case, however, it is not clear why such individuals would not simply be able to 
eliminate the prohibition in the first place. 
 
With a large enough subsidy, it is possible that even if the median voter is an individual 
with high income individual and a low probability of illness, that person could choose a 
level of health care services that overinsures both himself and the rest of the population. 
Figure 2 depicts the choice of public payment for health care services with a subsidy by a 
median voter who is a low-income individual with a low probability of illness (or low risk) 
and a median voter who is a high-income, low-risk individual, and the latter’s preference 
for private health insurance depending on the size of a subsidy for public health care 
services. The figure shows that, with a subsidy of 50% on the tax price of public finance 
for health care services, a median voter who is a high-income, low-risk individual would 
choose a high level of services (2.5 times their endowed income). As the subsidy falls, that 
voter’s support for public health care services would also fall, collapsing to zero if the 
subsidy were below 40%. 
 
Figure 2 suggests that changes in federal finance commitments for provincial health 
spending that would have reduced the subsidy from around 50% would be catastrophic for 
                                                 
28 Evans (2004, 187) further argues that the real motive underlying proposals for more private financing is simply to 
allow those with high incomes to obtain first-class care without having to pay taxes to help support a similar 
standard of care for everyone else. In his view, the prohibition on private payment and private insurance for 
medicare services ensures that high-income Canadians pay the necessary taxes to support medicare. 
29 High income individuals would support a positive level of public finance of health care in the absence of a 
subsidy if the public finance arrangement had a lower tax price than the price of available private insurance.  This 
could be the case if private insurance profit margins and administrative overhead costs are high enough to offset the 
disadvantage of the tax price for high income types.   
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the public health care system if the median voter were a high-income, low-risk individual. 
Such a median voter would have pushed for zero public health care services and a switch 
to a fully privately financed health care system. In contrast, if the median voter were a low-
income, low-risk individual, reducing the subsidy would reduce the level of services made 
available but would not necessarily threaten the political viability of the public health care 
system even if high-income individuals demanded private health insurance. Indeed, 
support for public health care by such a median voter would survive even if the subsidy 
were less than 10%. Notice also that the subsidy could fall dramatically before high-
income individuals start to demand private health insurance, and even as such insurance 
emerged, its growth would be gradual and the market size would remain relatively small. 
 
Figure 2  
 
 
 
 
 
The policy literature that has looked at the issue of private payment for medicare services 
in Canada supports the scenario of the median voter who is a low-income, low-risk 
individual over that of the median voter who is a high-income, low-risk individual. The 
likely size of the market for private insurance is, in any case, small (Evans 2004; Emery 
and Gerrits 2006). Polling of Canadians suggests that a majority does not feel unsatisfied 
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with the public system and that only a minority believes private payment and private 
insurance would be a good way to add revenues to the health care system.30  
 
As the median voter who is a low-income, low-risk individual, in particular, has faced a 
rising tax price for health care — with the reduced federal subsidization of provincial 
spending on health care services and the increasing reluctance of provincial governments 
to run deficits — the level of public health care spending has fallen, creating an unmet 
demand (or a larger unmet demand) on the part of high-income individuals. In other words, 
the demand for private insurance is a symptom of the underlying changes to public health 
care spending, rather than the cause of such changes (see Figure 3). Indeed, the timing of 
these changes explains why there was little opposition to the passage of the 1984 CHA, 
which became law at a time when public spending levels were high due to the subsidized 
tax price, and why challenges to these changes have mounted since 1995.31 
 
Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 See Health Care in Canada Surveys, annual 1999-2007; available online at http://www.hcic-sssc.ca/index_e.asp 
POLLARA results. The 2007 survey asked, “If more money was needed to improve the health care system, which of 
the following options would you most strongly support?” Only 13% of respondents supported “[h]aving the public 
purchase supplemental, private health insurance to cover a portion of the cost of health care, either directly 
themselves or through their Employer”; 19% believed that the system would be improved by “[i]ncreasing taxes and 
directing it to the health care system,” while 29% preferred to see funding diverted from other government services 
to health care; see also Boychuk (2008a). Ruggeri, Van Wart, and Howard (1995) look at the fiscal incidence of 
policy options using income data for 1986 and voter participation rates for 1984 to infer voters’ preferences over 
various policy options for balancing the federal budget. They find that the coalition favouring expenditure cuts and 
opposing tax increases is made up largely of households with above-median income and above-average propensity 
to vote and whose members tend to be in their peak earnings years. With a potential electoral majority against tax 
increases in the 1980s, the policy choice was between cuts in government services and cuts in transfers. The former 
presents less opposition and, therefore, would have been expected to be the first choice, at least in the first round. 
31 Federal government cash transfers for health care fell from 25.2% of provincial government expenditures on 
health care in 1977 to 24% in 1984 and to 12.8% in 2000 (Banting and Boadway 2004, 17). 
 21
Ironically, this median voter model suggests that rising income inequality might have 
eliminated growing political pressure to weaken the CHA’s incentives intended to preclude 
private health insurance purchases. Saez and Veall (2005) document the rising income 
share of high-income Canadians after the 1990s, which might have been responsible for the 
return of high growth rates of public health care spending. Overall, the federal tax system 
became more, not less, progressive over the 1990s (Martineau 2005; see also Dyck 2003). 
Between 1990 and 2002, the 10% of Canadians with the highest incomes paid more than 
half of all federal income tax, while the amount this high-income group paid increased at 
the same rate as their incomes. In contrast, the 50% of taxfilers with the lowest incomes 
paid less federal tax in 2002 than in 1990 despite their incomes having risen over the same 
period. The result was a lower tax price for health care services for low-income 
individuals, which led to an expansion of services and a reduction in demand for 
supplementary insurance.  
 
Figure 4 shows the choice of health care services by the median voter who is a low-
income, low-risk individual as the ratio of high-income to low-income increases, holding 
all else constant. The demand for private insurance in this model is “gap insurance” to 
cover the difference between an individual’s total insurance demand and what is provided 
to them through publicly financed health care services.  Recall that only high income types 
will have unmet insurance demands.  Also shown in the Figure is the choice of private 
health insurance by high-income, low-risk individuals relative to their incomes. Up to an 
income ratio of 1.8, the median voter who is a low-income, low-risk individual chooses to 
have no public finance of health care services since the tax price of a unit of services 
exceeds its actuarially fair market insurance price. Up to an income ratio of 1.8, both low- 
and high-income individuals would fully insure through the private market to have 95% of 
their uninsured income in the healthy state in both states of the world. As the income ratio 
rises, the transfer to low-income individuals from high-income individuals reduces the 
former’s tax price and they would choose a level of public health care services that exceeds 
their endowed income in the healthy state. Up to an income ratio of 3.0, a low-risk, low-
income median voter chooses a level of public spending on health care that is 1.4 times 
their income. It is clear that low-income individuals in this overinsured situation would not 
demand private health insurance. In contrast, a low-income, low-risk median voter’s choice 
of government spending on health care is less than half a high income individual’s 
endowed income resulting in a positive demand for supplementary private health 
insurance.  A high income individual would purchase an amount of private health 
insurance that is around 40% of his endowed income. High-income individuals would be 
strictly worse off with the mixed finance system than with a pure private system since their 
total insurance coverage would be less due to the higher cost for them of publicly financed 
health services. In the situation depicted, a prohibition on the purchase of private insurance 
(requiring that no individuals wish to acquire private health insurance) has a high welfare 
cost for high-income individuals. 
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Figure 4 
 
 
 
 
 
Looking to the future, the model allows one to consider the potential impact of population 
aging on medicare and the level of public health care spending. The share of Canada’s 
population over age 65 is forecast to increase from around 12% to 25% between 1980 and 
2030, and health care expenditures are forecast to increase around 1% per year between 
now and 2050. Given this apparently modest spending growth, some observers suggest that 
population aging is not a serious problem for the financial sustainability of medicare (see, 
for example, Evans et al. 2001; Hogan and Hogan 2004). Nevertheless, this modest fiscal 
impact still might result in a serious political crisis for medicare. In Figure 5, I consider a 
situation where the median voter is a low-income, low-risk individual and the population is 
aging, which I represent with a growing share of the high-risk population. As the 
proportion of high-risk individuals in the population rises, the choice of health care 
services by this median voter falls (increasing the transfer from low-risk to high-risk 
individuals). As the level of health care services falls, demand for private insurance by 
high-income individuals rises, as they have greater unmet demand through the public 
system. But this is not the source of the political crisis. Rather, the real problem for 
governments is that, when the share of the high-risk population reaches 25%, the tax price 
of health care services for low-income, low-risk individuals becomes too high and they 
prefer no services. There is no soft landing in this model, as the switch by low-income, 
low-risk individuals from relying solely on public health care services to relying solely on 
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private health insurance is immediate — unless, of course, population aging also induces 
higher incomes (as discussed in Bohn 1999; and Emery and Rongve 1999). 
 
 
Figure 5 
 
 
 
 
 
The above example above also provides a different explanation for the alleged cost 
inflation in mixed public/private health care finance systems compared to a single-payer 
arrangement like Canada’s. In a comparison of OECD countries, Tuohy, Flood, and Stabile 
(2004) find that mixed-finance systems have higher costs of public insurance than single-
payer public systems, which has been interpreted as evidence of the negative influence of 
parallel private insurance coverage on the public system. The model I present here, 
however, provides an alternative view: in OECD countries with a higher proportion of 
individuals with a high risk of illness (such as the elderly), the amount of public health care 
services available will be lower because of the higher tax price of providing such services, 
and demand for private health insurance will be higher. This results in a correlation 
between the costs of public insurance and the structure of financing the insurance, but the 
structure of finance is a result, rather than the cause, of the cost difference.  
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CONCLUSIONS  
 
The infusion of the health care system with revenues from non-income tax bases is a key 
explanation for the political popularity of public health insurance and for the lack of 
political pressure to allow supplementary private insurance coverage. It is interesting that 
the key recommendation to come from the Romanow Commission was to increase both the 
federal share and the level of health care spending.32 In the short run, this policy would 
help to sustain, if not increase, the overall level of public health care spending so long as 
Canadians did not recognize the current and future tax obligations arising from a return to 
the older model of health care finance. In terms of maintaining national support for the 
principles of the 1984 Canada Health Act, the Romanow Commission’s recommendation 
would be effective due to the redistribution of after-tax incomes across provincial 
populations that would result. Moreover, to the extent that the “have” provinces 
redistribute public revenue to the “have-not” provinces, the recommendation would garner 
support among the latter, but would that support be sufficient to offset opposition in the 
“have” provinces?33 
 
More fundamentally, is it socially desirable to sustain single-payer medicare by subsidizing 
its tax price and obfuscating the link between spending levels on health care and the tax 
cost of that spending? Much has been made of the social solidarity expressed through the 
single-payer health care system and the preclusion of parallel private payment and 
insurance.34 If the system were fully financed on a pure pay-as-you-go arrangement, with 
no subsidy or borrowing to augment spending levels, then it could be socially desirable, 
but only in the absence of an aging population — with population aging, a pay-as-you-go 
system would fail to price the future liabilities of the population, resulting in a greater 
financial burden on future generations. Indeed, Canadians have not paid the full resource 
costs of their chosen health care spending levels, leaving future generations to pay for 
today’s health care services. In other words, the Romanow Commission’s proposal would 
                                                 
32 As the report notes (2002, xvii),[t]o be sure, the system needs more money. In the early 1990s, the federal share of 
funding for the system declined sharply. While recent years have seen a substantial federal reinvestment into health 
care, the federal government contributes less than it previously did, and less than it should. I am therefore 
recommending the establishment of a minimum threshold for federal funding, as well as a new funding arrangement 
that provides for greater stability and predictability — contingent on this replenishment supporting the 
transformative changes outlined in this report. 
33 After dramatic reductions in non-renewable resource revenues and the elimination of its health care premiums, 
and facing looming tax increases and/or expenditure cuts, Alberta recently requested $700 million annually in 
additional funding for health care from the federal government. Ottawa rejected this request even though, under a 
ten-year federal-provincial 2004 agreement, Alberta receives about $200 less per resident in health transfer funding 
than do most other provinces because of the strength of its tax revenues. MP Ted Menzies, parliamentary secretary 
to federal finance minister Jim Flaherty, commented: “The day or the minute that Alberta becomes a have-not 
province, pray to God they don’t, then we have to readdress Alberta's health transfer” (quoted in Renata D’aliesio 
and Jason Fekete, “Feds deny Alberta’s health cash appeal: Ottawa will give province $222M for infrastructure,” 
Calgary Herald, 7 July 2009, pp. A1, A7). 
34 The Romanow Commission (2002, 31) asserts that “our tax-funded, universal health care system provides a kind 
of ‘double solidarity.’ It provides equity of funding between the ‘haves’ and the ‘havenots’ in our society and it also 
provides equity between the healthy and the sick.” For evidence on the progressivity of Canadian health care 
finance, see Dyck (2003, 18-19); Evans (2003, 17); and McGrail (2007). Glied (2008a) challenges this perception, 
however, by arguing that the “haves” have higher health care costs along with their higher taxes since they make 
more use of specialist services and diagnostic services. 
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maintain temporary solidarity among Canadians but at the expense of intergenerational 
inequities. Robson (2007) identifies an enormous unfunded liability of Canadian health 
care under the status quo that will require higher taxes or lower spending levels in future 
— in short, future Canadians will pay more and/or get less from medicare than do today’s 
Canadians. 
 
Canada’s public health insurance system is alleged to be in the midst of a political crisis, 
and that opposition to the system is coming from high-income Canadians who would prefer 
not to pay the taxes that are redistributed to lower-income Canadians through the health 
insurance arrangement and who would rather be able to purchase private health insurance. 
In this view, the Canada Health Act’s prohibition of supplementary private insurance is 
deemed essential to maintain higher-income Canadians; commitment to the redistributive 
function of the current health insurance system and to ensure that adequate public funding 
is available for it. Allowing the rich to purchase private insurance, it is argued, would 
reduce their “voice” in encouraging more resources for the public health care system. 
 
In this paper, I have examined a simple political economy model of a public health 
insurance arrangement that demonstrates that complaints of higher-income Canadians 
likely have little effect on the public health insurance system. The majority of Canadians 
who prefer to have public health insurance also have no demand for supplementary private 
health insurance, since the level of coverage in the public system more than fully insures 
them due to the redistribution that occurs from high-income to lower-income individuals. If 
the amount of redistribution or the level of tax premium subsidization were to fall, 
however, lower-income Canadians would choose to have a less generous public health care 
system. And, if the level of public health insurance coverage were to fall, the desire of 
higher-income Canadians to purchase supplementary private insurance would increase, 
since the public system would cover less of their total insurance demand. The important 
point to recognize is that, under the status quo, allowing the private insurance market to 
develop would have no impact on the level of public health insurance coverage, since that 
coverage is not determined by higher-income Canadians. Thus, there is little justification 
for the continued prohibition of supplementary private insurance coverage; it likely does 
nothing to improve the financial or political sustainability of Canada’s public health 
insurance arrangement, but it does reduce the well-being of higher-income Canadians.   
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